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FIRST ARGUMENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT
Talbot D'Alemberte*
My first case in the Supreme Court was Herrera v. Collins,'
a capital case out of Texas that raised the question of whether
federal habeas corpus can be used to test the issue of actual
innocence after an adverse final judgment in a state court.
Before taking Herrera, I had argued two capital cases on
appeal-one in the Florida Supreme Court and one before an en
banc panel of the Eleventh Circuit and, though I am not a
criminal lawyer, much less an expert on federal post-conviction
relief, I knew that the Supreme Court was sharply divided on
issues relating to federal habeas and that it was particularly
fractured on issues relating to the death penalty. I knew that the
crime charged-the murder of a police officer-was a difficult
context for the case, and I knew that the long period of time
since the state court trial and appellate disposition, coupled with
previously exhausted post-conviction efforts, were facts that cut
very much against us.
Still, through some very skillful lawyering, those who
handled the case below had been able to get the four votes
necessary for certiorari. It was my job to hold those votes and
find a fifth.
In all appellate work, I believe strongly in mock appellate
arguments and, indeed, I believe that it is very useful to have
several of these. Even before writing the brief, I find it helpful to
have a mock argument before attorneys who are experts in the
substantive field at issue, and then to use those sessions to guide
the crafting of the brief.
* Mr. D'Alemberte, a former president of the American Bar Association, is President
Emeritus of the Florida State University.
1. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
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In this instance, I had the great benefit of a co-counsel who
was very knowledgeable about the law in capital cases, Mark
Olive, and we decided that we needed intense feedback as we
prepared for the argument. Luckily, the Florida State University
College of Law (where I was then a faculty member) allowed us
during the fall semester of 1992 to team-teach a role-playing
class built around the Herrera case.
We enrolled students in the numbers required to have nine
stand-ins for the members of the Supreme Court plus two
students assigned to represent the state of Texas, and immersed
them for the first part of the term in the law of habeas and
capital post-conviction litigation. After lectures, they studied the
Court's opinions on those topics, nine of them paying particular
attention to the opinions of the justices whose roles they would
play during the oral argument and in conference.
As the semester progressed, we came together for a formal
argument, a follow-up conference, and opinion-writing by the
students. I appeared before the student court and was,
predictably, worked over very hard by the student playing the
role of Justice Scalia. The other members of the mock court
were also very vigorous in their questioning and, following
argument, in their conference discussions, which Mark and I
observed. It was instructive, if sobering, to watch the students
debate the issues and to read their opinions. The outcome did not
bolster my optimism about the case-the mock court ruled with
Texas-but this intensive exercise was very useful in preparing
for argument, especially as it helped me sharpen my planned
responses to the questions we most expected the Court to raise.
We supplemented this law-school exercise by engaging in a
moot court conducted by habeas experts in Atlanta (I think the
students were at least as tough), and then, just before argument,
another before a panel of Supreme Court experts in Washington,
D.C.
At the end of this preparation, the actual appearance before
the Court was, in some respects, laden with less terror than
might otherwise have been the case. The possibility that I might
embarrass myself before my own students had prompted me to
prepare carefully right from the start. I thought I was ready. Still,
this was the United States Supreme Court and the case involved
a death-row inmate. Those cases always carry an extra burden:
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The sleepless nights and worry that inevitably dog the lawyer
have only one benefit-it is a sure-fire way to lose weight, and I
believe that I lost over ten pounds in the weeks leading up to the
argument.
The normal tension in a Supreme Court argument,
heightened on this occasion by both my first-appearance jitters
and the gravity of the issues that I was set to argue, was further
augmented by the certain knowledge that the case was likely to
draw strong reaction from some of the justices, at least if they
played their roles as well as the law students had. I suspected
that those members of the Court who had been steadily cutting
back on post-conviction relief would not enjoy facing the issue
of actual innocence, and I had no doubt that this case would be
met with a barrage of questions about the underlying facts.
My preparation was not wasted, for the Court was
extremely hot in its questioning. From the very first question, it
was clear that the members of the Court who were hostile to the
idea that federal habeas could accommodate a claim of
innocence were attempting to push me into making a sweeping
claim. I resisted their efforts, because I felt that I only needed to
demonstrate that there was a sufficient factual basis in my case
for a federal district judge to order an evidentiary hearing.
Prevailing on that point would have been sufficient to get my
client a second chance, and in a death case, a second chance for
his client is often the best a lawyer can hope for.
Like those of most oral arguments I have conducted, my
memories of this one are not a good source for a detailed
summary of what transpired. I do remember several of the
exchanges and, in some of these-but not all-my memory
accords with the transcript. I do not remember being paralyzed
or terrified, but I do recall that the pace of questioning was so
intense that there were times that I did not have a chance to fully
answer a question before another question was put to me. Still,
2. To better prepare myself on the facts, I spent a week in the South Texas counties
where the case arose and visited with the people who had given affidavits in support of my
client's claim of innocence, as well as others in the legal and political community there. I
came during that trip to sense the strong local passion that surrounded this case, and I also
came to admire the Reagan-appointed federal district judge who had ordered a hearing only
to have that order promptly and abruptly displaced by a panel of the Fifth Circuit. See
Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
thanks to the intensive preparation we had undertaken, I felt
prepared and strangely comfortable.
The Court's eventual ruling did not leave me so
comfortable. The majority held that the facts did not justify the
trial court's order of an evidentiary hearing and, although a
majority of the Court supported the use of habeas to demonstrate
innocence in a case where there was a stronger factual basis,3 my
client was executed.
Since Herrera, I have been back to the Supreme Court and
have had other appellate arguments, but I have never handled a
more important case.
3. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404-05.
